
Private Information Leakage on the Mobile Web

Zach Azar, Stephen Rice, Amanda Kirk, Yipu Wang

Introduction

- Goals:
 - Investigate the leakage of private information to third parties
 - Mobile Websites
 - Leakage via HTTP Requests
- What sensitive information leaks?
- Who does it leak to?
- How does it leak?

Introduction to Web Tracking



 "56% of 120 popular sites in our study (75% if you include user ids) directly leak sensitive and identification information to third party aggregators."

Privacy Leakage vs. Protection Measures: The Growing Disconnect by Balachander Krishnamurthy, et al.

Third Party Leakage

GET	http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/radio;ag=30; gnd=1; <u>zip=12201</u> ;artist=R53599;genre=rock;
Referer	http://www.amazon.com/

Example of information leakage through the GET URL

GET	http://ad.doubleclick.net/?l=7654&sz=200x250
Referer	http://www.amazon.com/hserver/age=30/ <u>zip=12201</u> /g ender=M/

Example of information leakage through the Referer

Krishnamurthy's Previous Work

	Desktop	Mobile
Online Social Network (OSN)		
Non-OSN		Our Study

Krishnamurthy's Results of Desktop Web Tracking

Leakage of Personal Information Via Web Sites Across Categories

×				Action		
	Sites w/		Account	View/		
	Direct	Create	Login/	Edit	Input	Sens.
Category	Leakage	Account	Navig.	Profile	Content	Search
Health	9	0	1	0	0	9
Travel	9	0	1	0	O	9
Employment	8	0	2	2	7	0
OSN	7	0	3	5	0	0
Arts	7	0	3	4	1	0
Relationships	7	0	3	2	2	0
News	5	0	5	O	O	0
PhotoShare	4	3	3	O	1	0
Sports	4	1	2	O	1	0
Shopping	3	0	2	O	2	0
AgeGroups	2	O	1	1	0	0
VideoGames	2	0	1	1	0	0
Tot. Sites/Cat.	67/12	4/2	27/12	15/6	14/6	18/2

Foundational Work

Project Setup

- Data Gathering Methodology
 - What types of sites do we look at?
 - How do we choose specific sites?
 - How do we ensure consistency across our data set?

Categories

Health (Stephen)



Shopping (Yipu)



Travel (Amanda)



Relationships (Zach)



Choosing the Websites


- Alexa
 - Ranks sites via popularity and use
- Our Criteria:
 - One of the top ranked sites
 - Does not require payment for registration
 - U.S. Based, Website in English
 - Not an Online Social Network (OSN)

Websites Chosen

Health	Relationships	Travel	Shopping
nih.gov	okcupid.com	agoda.com	amazon.com
webmd.com	pof.com	expedia.com	ebay.com
mayoclinic.com	kiss.com	booking.com	netflix.com
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmed	datehookup.com	hotels.com	walmart.com
myfitnesspal.com	friendfinder.com	tripadvisor.com	cvs.com

Test User

- Meet Mathew Lamar Anderson
 - User Name: LambDUHyhn
 - o DOB: 9/12/1988
 - E-mail: lambduhyhn@gmail.com
 - o Likes: Batman, Eric Clapton, Sushi
 - Also contained information about social habits, drug and alcohol use, dating profiles and lyme disease



Data Collection & Analysis


Model / Experiment Setup / Tools Used




- Utilize the computer as a proxy server for the mobile device
- Fiddler allowed us to intercept, save and analyze the collected data

Web Crawls

- Each Crawl followed a set of procedures
 - Act like a normal user
 - Create Accounts
 - Search
 - Navigate Pages
 - Edit Profiles
 - Record actions in a roadmap document



Fiddler Example



Method for Analyzing Data


- Create a list of possible search terms
- Search all packets for leakage of each term
- 3. Investigate matches
 - Is it a third party?
 - Can we prove it is leakage?

Search Terms:


Username	Email	Zip Code
username	email	zipcode
un	em	zip
user	mail	postal
uid	lambduhyn@ gmail.com	postalcode
LambDUHyhn		80203

Results

Attributes Leaked per Category




Number of First Parties who Leaked to Third Parties (Health)



Number of First Parties who Leak to Each Third Party (Shopping)




Number of First Parties who Leak to Each Third Party (Travel)




Third Parties


Number of First Parties who Leaked to Third Parties (Relationships)




Attributes Leaked Per Crawl Stage (Health)




Attributes Leaked Per Crawl Stage (Shopping)




Attributes Leaked Per Crawl Stage (Travel)




Attributes Leaked Per Crawl Stage (Relationships)




How Each Attribute Was Leaked (Health)




How Each Attribute Was Leaked (Shopping)



How Each Attribute Was Leaked (Travel)



How Each Attribute Was Leaked (Relationships)



Future Work

- More data, more sites, more crawls
 - Does the information leaked change for older user accounts?
- Encrypted arguments
 - Many packets contained encrypted data that we suspect has leakage but cannot prove
- Cookies
 - How do cookies interact with GET/Referer leakage?
- Linking between third parties
 - Do third parties share information about us?

Conclusion





Our results for private information leakage in a mobile platform are comparable to Krishnamurthy's results from his previous study on a desktop platform for various non-OSN categories.

Questions?

References

- Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology by Mayer and Mitchell
- Privacy Leakage vs. Protection Measures by Krishnamurthy and Wills
- Tracking the Trackers: Where Everybody Knows Your Username by Mayer
- Privacy Leakage in Mobile Online Social Networks by Krishnamurthy and Wills
- Privacy Diffusion on the Web: a Longitudinal Study by Krishnamurthy and Wills
- On the Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information via OSN's by Krishnamurthy and Wills